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Abstract. Puncturable encryption (PE), proposed by Green and Miers at IEEE S&P 2015, is a
kind of public key encryption that allows recipients to revoke individual messages by repeatedly
updating decryption keys without communicating with senders. PE is an essential tool for con-
structing many interesting applications, such as asynchronous messaging systems, forward-secret
zero round-trip time protocols, public-key watermarking schemes and forward-secret proxy re-
encryptions. This paper revisits PEs from the observation that the puncturing property can be
implemented as efficiently computable functions. From this view, we propose a generic PE con-
struction from the fully key-homomorphic encryption, augmented with a key delegation mechanism
(DFKHE) from Boneh et al. at Eurocrypt 2014. We show that our PE construction enjoys the
selective security under chosen plaintext attacks (that can be converted into the adaptive security
with some efficiency loss) from that of DFKHE in the standard model. Basing on the framework,
we obtain the first post-quantum secure PE instantiation that is based on the learning with errors
problem, selective secure under chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model. We also
discuss about the ability of modification our framework to support the unbounded number of
ciphertext tags inspired from the work of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan at CRYPTO 2016.
Key words: Puncturable encryption, attribute-based encryption, learning with errors,
arithmetic circuits, fully key-homomorphic encryption, key delegation
1 Introduction
Puncturable encryption (PE), proposed by Green and Miers [18] in 2015, is a kind of public key
encryption, which can also be seen as a tag-based encryption (TBE), where both encryption
and decryption are controlled by tags. Similarly to TBE, a plaintext in PE is encrypted together
with tags, which are called ciphertext tags. In addition, the puncturing property of PE allows
to produce new punctured secret keys associated some punctures (or punctured tags). Although
the new keys (puncture keys) differ from the old ones, they still allow recipients to decrypt old
ciphertexts as long as chosen punctured tags are different from tags embedded in the ciphertext.
The puncturing property is very useful when the current decryption key is compromised. In a
such situation, a recipient merely needs to update his key using the puncturing mechanism. PE
is also useful when there is a need to revoke decryption capability from many users in order
to protect some sensitive information (e.g., a time period or user identities). In this case, the
puncturing mechanism is called for time periods or user identities.
Also, PE can provide forward security in a fine-grained level. Forward security, formulated in
[19] in the context of key-exchange protocols, is a desired security property that helps to reduce
a security risk caused by key exposure attacks. In particular, forward secure encryption (FSE)
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guarantees confidentiality of old messages, when the current secret key has been compromised.
Compared to PE, FSE provides a limited support for revocation of decryption capability. For
instance, it is difficult for FSE to control decryption capability for any individual ciphertext
(or all ciphertexts) produced during a certain time period, which, in contrast, can be easily
done with PE.
Due to the aforementioned advantages, PE has become more and more popular and has been
used in many important applications in such as asynchronous messaging transport systems [18],
forward-secure zero round–trip time (0-RTT) key-exchange protocols [15, 20], public-key wa-
termarking schemes [12] and forward-secure proxy re-encryptions [16].
Related Works. Green and Miers [18] propose the notion of PE and also present a spe-
cific ABE-based PE instantiation. The instantiation is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman assumption (DBDH) in bilinear groups and is proven to be CPA secure in the random
oracle model (ROM). Following the work [18], many other constructions have been proposed
such as [10, 12, 15, 20, 26] (see Table 1 for a summary). For instance, Gu¨nther et al. [20] have
provided a generic PE construction from any selectively secure hierarchical identity-based key
encapsulation (HIBEKEM) combined with an any one time signature (OTS). In fact, the au-
thors of [20] claim that their framework can be instantiated as the first post-quantum PE.
Also, in the work [20], the authors present the first PE-based forward-secret zero round-trip
time protocol with full forward secrecy. However, they instantiate PE that is secure in the
standard model (SDM) by combining a (DDH)-based HIBE with a OTS based on discrete
logarithm. The construction supports a predetermined number of ciphertext tags as well as a
limited number of punctures. Derler et al. [15] introduce the notion of Bloom filter encryption
(BFE), which can be converted to PE. They show how to instantiate BFE using identity-based
encryption (IBE) with a specific construction that assumes intractability of the bilinear com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH) problem. Later, Derler et. al. [14] extend the result of [15]
and give a generic BFE construction from identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE). The
instantiation in [14] is based on a generalization of the Diffie-Hellman exponent (GDDHE)
assumption in parings. However, the construction based on BFE suffers from non-negligible
correctness error. This excludes it from applications that require negligible correctness error,
as discussed in [26]. Most recently, Sun et al. [26] have introduced a new concept, which they
call key-homomorphic identity-based revocable key encapsulation mechanism (KH-IRKEM)
with extended correctness, from which they obtain a modular design of PE with negligible cor-
rectness errors. In particular, they describe four modular and compact instantiations of PE,
which are secure in SDM. However, all of them are based on hard problems in pairings, namely
q-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent problem (q–DBDHE), the decision bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem(DBDH), the q-decisional multi-exponent bilinear Diffie-Hellman (q-MEBDH)
problem and the decisional linear problem (DLIN). We emphasize that all existing instantia-
tions mentioned above are insecure against quantum adversaries. Some other works like [10,12]
based PE on the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation, which is still impractical. The reader
is referred to [26] for a state-of-the-art discussion.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no specific lattice-based PE instantiation,
which simultaneously enjoys negligible correctness error as well as post-quantum security in
the standard model.
Our Contribution. We first give a generic construction of PE from delegatable fully key-
homomorphic encryption (DFKHE) framework. The framework is a generalisation of fully key-
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homomorphic encryption (FKHE) [5] by adding a key delegation mechanism. The framework
is closely related to the functional encryption [7].
We also present an explicit PE construction based on lattices. Our design is obtained from
LWE-based DFKHE that we build using FKHE for the learning with errors (LWE) setting [5].
This is combined with the key delegation ability supplied by the lattice trapdoor techniques
[1, 11,17]. Our lattice FE construction has the following characteristics:
– It supports a predetermined number of ciphertext tags per ciphertext. The ciphertext size is
short and depends linearly on the number of ciphertext tags, which is fixed in advance. How-
ever, we note that following the work of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [8], our construction
might be extended to obtain a variant that supports unbounded number of ciphertext tags
(see Section 5 for a detailed discussion),
– It works for a predetermined number of punctures. The size of decryption keys (i.e., puncture
keys) increases quadratically with the number of punctured tags,
– It offers selective CPA security in the standard model (that can be converted into full CPA
security using the complexity leveraging technique as discussed in [9], [21] [4], [5]). This is
due to CPA security of LWE-based underlying DFKHE (following the security proof for the
generic framework).
– It enjoys post-quantum security and negligible correctness errors.
Table 1 compares our work with the results obtained by other authors. At first sight, the
FE framework based on key homomorphic revocable identity-based (KH-IRKEM) [26] looks
similar to ours. However, both frameworks are different. While key-homomorphism used by us
means the capacity of transforming (as claimed in [5, Subsection 1.1]) “an encryption under key
x into an encryption under key f(x)”, key-homomorphism defined in [26, Definition 8] reflects
the ability of preserving the algebraic structure of (mathematical) groups.
Overview and Techniques.We start with a high-level description of fully-key homomorphism
encryption (FHKE), which was proposed by Boneh et al. [5]. Afterwards, we introduce what we
call the delegetable fully-key homomorphism encryption (DFHKE). At high-level description,
FKHE possesses a mechanism that allows to convert a ciphertext ctx (associated with a public
variable x) into the evaluated one ctf for the same plaintext (associated with the pair (y, f)),
where f is an efficiently computable function and f(x) = y. In other words, FKHE requires
a special key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm, called Eval, such that ctf ← Eval(f, ctx).
In order to successfully decrypt an evaluated ciphertext, the decryptor needs to evaluate the
initial secret sk to get skf . An extra algorithm, called KHom, is needed to do this, i.e. skf ←
KHom(sk, (y, f)). A drawback of FKHE is that it supports only a single function f .
Actually, we’d like to perform key-homomorphic evaluation for many functions {f1, · · · , fk}
that belong to a family F . To meet the requirement and obtain DFKHE, we generalise FKHE
by endowing it with two algorithms ExtEval and KDel. The first algorithm transforms (ctx,x)
into (ctf1,··· ,fk , (y, f1, · · · fk)), where f1(x) = · · · = fk(x) = y. This is written as ctf1,··· ,fk ←
ExtEval(f1, · · · , fk, ctx). The second algorithm allows to delegate the secret key step by step for
the next function or skf1,··· ,fk ← KDel(skf1,··· ,fk−1 , (y, fk)).
Our generic PE framework is inspired by a simple but subtle observation that puncturing
property requires equality of ciphertext tags and punctures. This can be provided by functions
that can be efficiently computed by arithmetic circuits. We call such functions equality test
functions. Note that for PE, ciphertext tags play the role of variables x’s and equality test
functions act as functions f ’s defined in FKHE. For FE, one more puncture added defines
one extra equality test function, which needs a delegation mechanism to take the function
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Literature From Assumption
Security
Model
#Tags #Punctures
Post-
quantum
Negl.
Corr.
Error
Green [18] ABE DBDH ROM <∞ ∞ × X
Gu¨nther [20]
any HIBE
+ any OTS
DDH (HIBE)
+ DLP (OTS)
SDM <∞ <∞ × X
Derler [14] BFE (IBBE) GDDHE ROM∗ 1 <∞ × ×
Derler [15] BFE (IBE) BCDH ROM 1 <∞ × ×
Sun [26] KH-IRKEM
q–DBDHE
DBDH
q–MEBDH
DLIN
SDM
<∞
<∞
∞
<∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
×
×
×
×
X
This work DFKHE DLWE SDM <∞ <∞ X X
Table 1: Comparison of some existing PE constructions in the literature with ours. Note that,
here all works are being considered in the CPA security setting. The notation “< ∞” means
”bounded” or “predetermined”, while “∞” means “unlimited” or “arbitrary”. The column enti-
tled “Post-quantum” says whether the specific construction in each framework is post-quantum
secure or not regardless its generic framework. The last column mentions to supporting the neg-
ligible correctness error. ROM∗: For the BFE-based FE basing on the IBBE instantiation of
Derler et al. [14], we note that, the IBBE instantiation can be modified to remove ROM, as
claimed by Delerable´e in [13, Subection 3.2]
into account. We note that the requirement can be easily met using the same idea as the key
delegation mentioned above. In order to be able to employ the idea of DFKHE for (y0,F)
to PE, we define an efficiently computable family F of equality test functions ft∗(t) allowing
us to compare the puncture t∗ with ciphertext tags t = (t1, · · · , td) under the definition that
ft∗(t) = y0 iff t
∗ 6= tj∀j ∈ [d], for some fixed value y0.
For concrete DHKHE and PE constructions, we employ the LWE-based FKHE proposed
in [5]. In this system, the ciphertext is ct = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout), where ci = (tiG+Bi)T s+ ei
for i ∈ [d]. Here the gadget matrix G is a special one, whose associated trapdoor TG (i.e.,
a short basis for the q-ary lattice Λ⊥q (G)) is publicly known (see [22] for details). Also, there
exist three evaluation algorithms named Evalpk, Evalct and Evalsim [5], which help us to homo-
morphically evaluate a circuit (function) for a ciphertext ct. More specifically, from ci :=
[tiG + Bi]
T s + ei, where ‖ei‖ < δ for all i ∈ [d], and a function f : (Zq)d → Zq, we
get cf = [f(t1, · · · , td)G + Bf ]T s + ef , ‖ef‖ < ∆, where Bf ← Evalpk(f, (Bi)di=1), cf ←
Evalct(f, ((ti,Bi, ci))
d
i=1), and ∆ < δ · β for some β sufficiently small. The algorithm ExtEval
mentioned above can be implemented calling many times Evalpk,Evalct, each time for each func-
tion. Meanwhile, Evalsim is only useful in the simulation for the security proof. In the LWE-based
DFKHE construction, secret keys are trapdoors for q-ary lattices of form Λ⊥q ([A|Bf1 | · · · |Bfk ]).
For the key delegation KDel, we can utilize the trapdoor techniques [1, 11, 17] . For the
LWE-based PE instantiation, we employ the equality test function with y0 := 0 (mod q).
Namely, for a puncture t∗ and a list of ciphertext tags t1, · · · , td we define ft∗(t1, · · · , td) :=
eqt∗(t1) + · · · + eqt∗(td), where eqt∗ : Zq → Zq satisfying that ∀t ∈ Zq, eqt∗(t) = 1 (mod q) iff
t = t∗, otherwise eqt∗(t) = 0 (mod q). Such functions has also been employed in [6] to construct
a privately puncturable pseudorandom function. It follows from generic construction that our
PE instantiation is selective CPA-secure.
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Public key size O((d+ 1) · n2 log2 q)
Secret key size O(n2 log2 q · log(n log q))
Punctured key size (η + 1) · n log q · (O(log(βF ) + η · log(n log q)))
Ciphertext size O((d+ 2) · n log2 q))
Table 2: Keys and ciphertext’s size of our LWE-based PE as functions in number of ciphertext
tags d and number of punctures η.
Efficiency. Table 2 summarizes the asymptotic bit-size of public key, secret key, punctured
key and ciphertext. We can see that the public key size is a linear function in the number of
ciphertext tags (i.e., d). The (initial) secret key size is independent of both d and η (the number
of punctures). The punctured key (decryption key) size is a quadratic function of η. Lastly, the
ciphertext size is a linear function of d.
On unbounded ciphertext tags.We believe that our framework can be extended to support
unbounded number of ciphertext tags by exploiting the interesting technique of [8]. The key
idea of [8] is to use homomorphic evaluation of a family pseudorandom functions. This helps
to stretch a predetermined parameter (e.g., the length of a seed) to an arbitrary number of
ciphertext tags. The predetermined parameter will be used to generate other public parameters
(e.g., public matrices). More details is given in Section 5.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we review some background related to this work. Our
main contributions are presented in Section 3 and Section 4. We formally define DFKHE and
the generic PE construction from DFKHE in Section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to the LWE-
based instantiation of DFKHE and the induced PE. Section 5 discusses on the feasibility of
transforming our proposed LWE-based PE to work well with unbounded ciphertext tags. This
work is concluded in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Framework of Puncturable Encryption
Syntax of puncturable encryption. For a security parameter λ, let d = d(λ), M =M(λ)
and T = T (λ) be maximum number of tags per ciphertext, the space of plaintexts and the
set of valid tags, respectively. Puncturable encryption (PE) is a collection of the following four
algorithms KeyGen, Encrypt, Puncture and Decrypt:
– (pk, sk0)← KeyGen(1λ, d): For a security parameter λ and the maximum number d of tags
per ciphertext, the probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm KeyGen outputs a public
key pk and an initial secret key sk0.
– ct← Encrypt(pk, µ, {t1, · · · , td}): For a public key pk, a message µ, and a list of tags
t1, · · · , td, the PPT algorithm Encrypt returns a ciphertext ct.
– ski ← Puncture(pk, ski−1, t∗i ): For any i > 1, on input pk, ski−1 and a tag t∗i , the PPT
algorithm Puncture outputs a punctured key ski that decrypts any ciphertexts, except for
the ciphertext encrypted under any list of tags containing t∗i .
– µ/⊥ ← Decrypt(pk, ski, (ct, {t1, · · · , td})): For input pk, a ciphertext ct, a secret key ski,
and a list of tags {t1, · · · , td}, the deterministic polynomial time (DPT) algorithm Decrypt
outputs either a message µ if the decryption succeeds or ⊥ if it fails.
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Correctness. The correctness requirement for PE is as follows:
For all λ, d, η ≥ 0, t∗1, · · · , t∗η, t1, · · · , td ∈ T , (pk, sk0)← KeyGen(1λ, d), ski ← Punc(pk, ski−1, t∗i ),
∀i ∈ [η], ct = Encrypt(pk, µ, {t1, · · · , td}), we have
– If {t∗1, · · · , t∗η} ∩ {t1, · · · , td} = ∅, then ∀i ∈ {0, · · · , η},
Pr[Decrypt(pk, ski, (ct, {t1, · · · , td})) = µ] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
– If there exist j ∈ [d] and k ∈ [η] such that t∗k = tj , then ∀i ∈ {k, · · · , η},
Pr[Decrypt(pk, ski, (ct, {t1, · · · , td})) = µ] ≤ negl(λ).
Definition 1 (Selective Security of PE). PE is IND-sPUN-ATK if the advantage of any
PPT adversary A in the game IND-sPUN-ATKsel,APE is negligible, where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA}.
Formally,
AdvIND-sPUN-ATKPE (A) = |Pr[b′ = b]−
1
2
| ≤ negl(λ).
The game IND-sPUN-ATKsel,APE proceeds as follows.
1. Initialize. The adversary announces the target tags {t̂1, · · · , t̂d}.
2. Setup. The challenger initializes a set punctured tags T ∗ ← ∅, a counter i← 0 that counts
the current number of punctured tags in T ∗ and a set of corrupted tags C∗ ← ∅ containing
all punctured tags at the time of the first corruption query. Then, it runs (pk, sk0) ←
KeyGen(1λ, d). Finally, it gives pk to the adversary.
3. Query 1.
– Once the adversary makes a puncture key query PQ(t∗), the challenger updates i← i+1,
returns ski ← Punc(pk, ski−1, t∗) and adds t∗ to T ∗.
– The first time the adversary makes a corruption query CQ(), the challenger returns ⊥ if
it finds out that {t̂1, · · · , t̂d}∩T ∗ = ∅. Otherwise, the challenger returns the most recent
punctured key skη, then sets C∗ as the most recent T ∗ (i.e., C∗ ← T ∗ = {t∗1, · · · , t∗η}).
All subsequent puncture key queries and corruption queries are answered with ⊥.
– If ATK = CCA: Once the adversary makes a decryption query DQ(ct, {t1, · · · , td}),
the challenger runs Decrypt(pk, skη, (ct, {t1, · · · , td})) using the most recent punctured
key skη and returns its output.
If ATK = CPA: the challenger returns ⊥.
4. Challenge. The adversary submits two messages µ0, µ1. The challenger rejects the chal-
lenge if it finds out that {t̂1, · · · , t̂d}∩C∗ = ∅3. Otherwise, the challenger chooses b $←− {0, 1}
and returns ĉt← Encrypt(pk, µb, {t̂1, · · · , t̂d}).
5. Query 2. The same as Query 1 with the restriction that for DQ(ct, {t1, · · · , td}), the
challenger returns ⊥ if (ct, {t1, · · · , td}) = (ĉt, {t̂1, · · · , t̂d}).
6. Guess. The adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. It wins if b′ = b.
The full security for PE is defined in the same way, except that the adversary can choose target
tags at Challenge phase, after getting the public key and after Query 1 phase. In this case, the
challenger does not need to check the condition {t̂1, · · · , t̂d} ∩ T ∗ = ∅ in the first corruption
query CQ() of the adversary in Query 1 phase.
3 Note that, after making some queries that are different from the target tags, the adversary may skip making
corruption query but goes directly to the challenge phase and trivially wins the game. This rejection pre-
vents the adversary from such a trivial win. It also force the adversary to make the corruption query before
challenging.
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2.2 Background on Lattices
In this work, all vectors are written as columns. The transpose of a vector b (resp., a matrix
A) is denoted as bT (resp., AT ). The Gram-Schmidt (GS) orthogonaliation of S := [s1, · · · , sk]
is denoted by S˜ := [˜s1, · · · , s˜k] in the same order.
Lattices. A lattice is a set L = L(B) := {∑mi=1 bixi : xi ∈ Z ∀i ∈ [m]} ⊆ Zm generated by a
basis B = [b1| · · · |bm] ∈ Zn×m. We are interested in the following lattices:
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 (mod q)} , Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u (mod q)} ,
ΛUq (A) :=
{
R ∈ Zm×k s.t. AR = U(mod q)} , where A $←− Zn×m, u ∈ Znq and U ∈ Zn×kq .
For a vector s = (s1, · · · , sn), ‖s‖ :=
√
s21 + · · ·+ s2n, ‖s‖∞ := maxi∈[n] |si|. For a matrix
S = [s1 · · · sk] and any vector x = (x1, · · · , xk), we define ‖S‖ := maxi∈[k] ‖si‖, the GS norm of
S is ‖S˜‖, the sup norm is ‖S‖sup = supx ‖Sx‖‖x‖ . This yields for all x that ‖Sx‖ ≤ ‖S‖sup · ‖x‖.
We call a basis S of some lattice short if ‖S˜‖ is short.
Gaussian Distributions. Assumem ≥ 1, v ∈ Rm, σ > 0, and x ∈ Rm. We define the function
ρσ,v(x) = exp(−π‖x− v‖2/σ2).
Definition 2 (Discrete Gaussians). Suppose that L ⊆ Zm is a lattice, and v ∈ Rm and
σ > 0. The discrete Gaussian distribution over L with center v and parameter σ is defined by
DL,σ,v(x) = ρσ,v(x)ρσ,v(L) for x ∈ L, where ρσ,v(L) :=
∑
x∈L ρσ,v(x).
Lemma 1 ( [23, Lemma 4.4]). Let q > 2 and let A,B be a matrix in Zn×mq with m > n. Let
TA be a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A). Then, for σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ ·ω(
√
log n), Pr[x← DΛ⊥q (A),σ : ‖x‖ > σ
√
m] ≤
negl(n).
Learning with Errors. The security for our construction relies on the decision variant of the
learning with errors (DLWE) problem defined below.
Definition 3 (DLWE, [25]). Suppose that n be a positive integer, q is prime, and χ is a
distribution over Zq. The (n,m, q, χ)-DLWE problem requires to distinguish (A,A
T s+ e) from
(A, c), where A
$←− Zn×mq , s $←− Znq , e← χm, c $←− Zmq .
Let χ be a χ0-bounded noise distribution, i.e., its support belongs to [−χ0, χ0]. The hardness
of DLWE is measured by q/χ0, which is always greater than 1 as χ0 is chosen such that χ0 < q.
Specifically, the smaller q/χ0 is, the harder DLWE is. (See [5, Subsection 2.2] and [8, Section
3] for further discussions.)
Lemma 2 ( [8, Corollary 3.2]). For all ǫ > 0, there exist functions q = q(n) ≤ 2n, m =
Θ(n log q) = poly(n), χ = χ(n) such that χ is a χ0-bounded for some χ0 = χ0(n), q/χ0 ≥ 2nǫ
and such that DLWEn,m,q,χ is at least as hard as the classical hardness of GapSVPγ and the
quantum hardness of SIVPγ for γ = 2
Ω(nǫ).
The GapSVPγ problem is the one, given a basis for a lattice and a positive number d, requires
to distinguish between two cases; (i)the lattice has a vector shorter than d, and (ii) all lattice
vector have length bigger than γ · d. And SIVPγ is the problem that, given a basis for a lattice
of rannk n, requires to find a set of n “short” and independent lattice vectors.
Leftover Hash Lemma. The following variant of the so-called leftover hash lemma will be
used in this work to support our arguments.
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Lemma 3 ( [1, Lemma 13]). Let m,n, q be such that m > (n+ 1) log2 q + ω(log n) and that
q > 2 is prime. Let A and B are uniformly chosen from Zn×mq and Z
n×k
q , respectively. Then
for any uniformly chosen matrix S from {−1, 1}m×k (mod q) and for all vectors e ∈ Zmq ,
(A,AS,ST e)
s≈ (A,B,ST e).
We conclude this section with some standard results regarding trapdoor mechanism often
used in lattice-based cryptography.
Lattice Trapdoor Mechanism. In our context, a (lattice) trapdoor is a short basis TA for
the q-ary lattice Λ⊥q (A), i.e., A ·TA = 0 (mod q) (see [17]). We call TA the associated trapdoor
for Λ⊥q (A) or even for A.
Lemma 4. Let n,m, q > 0 and q be prime.
1. (A,TA) ← TrapGen(n,m, q) ( [3], [22]): This is a PPT algorithm that outputs a pair
(A,TA) ∈ Zn×mq × Zm×mq , where TA is a trapdoor for Λ⊥q (A) such that A is negligibly
close to uniform and ‖T˜A‖ = O(
√
n log q). The algorithm works if m = Θ(n log q).
2. TD ← ExtBasisRight(D := [A|AS +B],TB) ( [1]): This is a DPT algorithm that, for the
input (D,TB), outputs a trapdoor TD for Λ
⊥
q (D) such that ‖T˜D‖ ≤ ‖T˜B‖(1 + ‖S‖sup),
where A,B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. TE ← ExtBasisLeft(E := [A|B],TA) ( [11]): This is a DPT algorithm that for E of the
form E := [A|B] and a trapdoor TA for Λ⊥q (A), outputs a trapdoor TE for Λ⊥q (E) such
that ‖T˜E‖ = ‖T˜A‖, where A,B ∈ Zn×mq .
4. R← SampleD(A,TA,U, σ) ( [17]): This is a PPT algorithm that takes a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq ,
its associated trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m, a matrix U ∈ Zn×kq and a real number σ > 0 and
returns a short matrix R ∈ Zm×kq chosen randomly according to a distribution that is
statistically close to DΛUq (A),σ. The algorithm works if σ = ‖T˜A‖ ·ω(
√
logm). Furthermore,
‖RT ‖sup ≤ σ
√
mk, ‖R‖sup ≤ σ
√
mk (see also in [5, Lemma 2.5]).
5. T′
A
← RandBasis(A,TA, σ) ( [11]): This is a PPT algorithm that takes a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq ,
its associated trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m, and a real number σ > 0 and returns a new basis T′A for
Λ⊥q (A) chosen randomly according to a distribution that is statistically close to (DΛ⊥q (A),σ)m,
and ‖T˜′
A
‖ ≤ σ√m. The algorithm works if σ = ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
logm).
3 Generic PE Construction from DFKHE
3.1 Delegatable Fully Key-homomorphic Encryption
Delegatable fully key-homomorphic encryption (DFKHE) can be viewed as a generalised notion
of the so-called fully key-homomorphic encryption (FKHE) [5] augmented with a key delegation
mechanism [5].
Informally, FKHE enables one to transform an encryption, say ctx, of a plaintext µ under a
public variable x into the one, say ctf , of the same µ under some value/function pair (y, f), with
the restriction that one is only able to decrypt the ciphertext ctf if f(x) = y. Similarly, DFHKP
together with the key delegation mechanism allows one to do the same but with more functions,
i.e., (y, f1, · · · , fk), and the condition for successful decryption is that f1(x) = · · · = fk(x) = y.
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Definition 4 (DFKHE). Let λ, d = d(λ) ∈ N be two positive integers and let T = T (λ) and
Y = Y(λ) be two finite sets. Define F = F(λ) = {f |f : T d → Y} to be a family of efficiently
computable functions. (λ, d, T ,Y,F)–DFKHE is a tuple consisting of algorithms as follows.
(dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sk)← DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F): This PPT algorithm takes as input a security
parameter λ and outputs a public key dfkhe.pk and a secret key dfkhe.sk.
dfkhe.sky,f ← DFKHE.KHom(dfkhe.sk, (y, f)): This PPT algorithm takes as input the secret
key dfkhe.sk and a pair (y, f) ∈ Y × F and returns a secret homomorphic key sky,f .
dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk+1 ← DFKHE.KDel(dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk , (y, fk+1)): This PPT algorithm
takes as input the public key dfkhe.pk, a function fk+1 ∈ F and the secret key dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk
and returns the delegated secret key dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk+1. Further, the key dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk is
produced either by DFKHE.KHom if k = 1, or iteratively by DFKHE.KDel if k > 1.
(dfkhe.ct, t)← DFKHE.Enc(dfkhe.pk, µ, t): This PPT algorithm takes as input the public key
dfkhe.pk, a plaintext µ and a variable t ∈ T d and returns a ciphertext dfkhe.ct– an encryp-
tion of µ under the variable t.
dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk ← DFKHE.ExtEval(f1, · · · , fk, (dfkhe.ct, t)): The DPT algorithm takes as input
a ciphertext dfkhe.ct and the associated variable t ∈ T d and returns an evaluated ciphertext
dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk. If f1(t) = · · · = fk(t) = y , then we say that dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk is an encryption
of µ using the public key (y, f1, · · · , fk).
µ/⊥ ← DFKHE.Dec(dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk , (dfkhe.ct, t)): The DPT algorithm takes as input a del-
egated secret key dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk and a ciphertext dfkhe.ct associated with t ∈ T d and
recovers a plaintext µ. It succeeds if fi(t) = y for all i ∈ [k]. Otherwise, it fails and returns
⊥. To recover µ, the algorithm first calls DFKHE.ExtEval(f1, · · · , fk, (dfkhe.ct, t)) and gets
dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk. Next it uses dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk and opens dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk .
Obviously, DFKHE from Definition 4 is identical to FKHE [5] if k = 1.
Correctness. For all µ ∈ M, all k ∈ N, all f1, · · · , fk ∈ F and t ∈ T d, y ∈ Y, over the random-
ness of (dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sk) ← FKHE.KGen(1λ,F), (dfkhe.ct, t) ← FKHE.Enc(dfkhe.pk, µ, t),
dfkhe.sky,f1 ← FKHE.KHom(dfkhe.sk, (y, f1)) and
dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fi ← FKHE.KDel(dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fi−1 , (y, fi)), dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk ← DFKHE.ExtEval
(f1, · · · , fk, (dfkhe.ct, t)) for all i ∈ {2, · · · , k}, then
– Pr[FKHE.Dec(dfkhe.sk, (dfkhe.ct, t)) = µ] ≥ 1− negl(λ),
– if y = f1(t) = · · · = fk(t), then
Pr[FKHE.Dec(dfkhe.sk, (dfkhe.ctf1,··· ,fk , t)) = µ] ≥ 1− negl(λ),
Pr[FKHE.Dec(dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fi , (dfkhe.ct, t)) = µ] ≥ 1− negl(λ),∀i ∈ [k],
– For any i ∈ [k], if y 6= fi(t),
Pr[FKHE.Dec(dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fj , (dfkhe.ct, t)) = µ] ≤ negl(λ),∀j ∈ {i, k}.
Security. Security of DFKHE is similar to that of FKHE from [5] with an extra evaluation
that includes the key delegation mechanisms.
Definition 5 (Selectively-secure CPA of DFKHE). DFKHE is IND-sVAR-CPA if for
any polynomial time adversary B in the game IND-sVAR-CPAsel,B
DFKHE
, the adversary advantage
AdvIND-sVAR-CPADFKHE (B) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤ negl(λ).
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The IND-sVAR-CPAsel,BDFKHE game is as follows.
1. Initialize. On the security parameter λ and λ–dependent tuple (d, (T ,Y,F)), B releases
the target variable t̂ = (t̂1, · · · , t̂d) ∈ T d.
2. Setup. The challenger runs (dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sk) ← DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F). Then, it gives
dfkhe.pk to B.
3. Query. B adaptively makes delegated key queries DKQ(y, (f1, · · · , fk)) to get the cor-
responding delegated secret keys. Specifically, B is allowed to have an access to the or-
acle KG(dfkhe.sk, t̂, y, (f1, · · · , fk)), which takes as input dfkhe.sk, t̂, a list of functions
f1, · · · , fk ∈ F and y ∈ Y and returns either ⊥ if all fj(t̂) = y, or the delegated secret key
dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk otherwise. The delegated secret key dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fk is computed calling
dfkhe.sky,f1 := DFKHE.KHom (dfkhe.sk, (y, f1)) and
dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fi ← DFKHE.KDel (dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sky,f1,··· ,fi−1 , (y, fi)), ∀i ∈ {2, · · · , k}.
4. Challenge. The adversary submits two messages µ0, µ1 (with t̂). The challenger in turn
chooses b
$←− {0, 1} and returns the output (dfkhe.ĉt, t̂) of DFKHE.Enc(dfkhe.pk, µb, t̂).
5. Guess. The adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. It wins if b′ = b.
3.2 Generic PE Construction from DFKHE.
The main idea behind our construction is an observation that ciphertext tags can be treated
as variables t = (t1, · · · , td) ∈ T d. The puncturing property, which is related to the “equality”,
suggests us to construct a family F of equality test functions, allowing to compare each pair
of ciphertext tags and punctures. Using this idea, we then can have a PE construction from
DFKHE.
Let λ, d = d(λ) ∈ N be two positive integers. Let T = T (λ) be a finite set (that henceforth
called the tag space) and Y = Y(λ) be also a finite set. In addition, let y0 ∈ Y be a some fixed
special element. Define a family of all equality test functions indicated by T ,
F = F(λ) :=
{
ft∗ |t∗ ∈ T ,∀t = (t1, · · · , td), ft∗ : T d → Y
}
, (1)
where ft∗(t) := y0 if t
∗ 6= ti,∀i ∈ [d], ft∗(t) := yt∗,t ∈ Y \ {y0}. Here, yt∗,t means depending on
the value of t∗ and t. Now, letΠ = (DFKHE.KGen,DFKHE.KHom, DFKHE.Enc, DFKHE.ExtEval,
DFKHE.KDel, DFKHE.Dec) be (λ, d, T ,Y,F)–DFHKE. Using Π, we can construct a PE sys-
tem Ψ = (PE.key,PE.enc,PE.pun, PE.dec) of which both tags and punctures reside in T . The
description of Ψ is below:
(pe.pk, pe.sk0)← PE.key(1λ, d): For input a security parameter λ and the maximum number d
of tags per ciphertext, run (dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sk)← DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F), and return pe.pk :=
dfkhe.pk, and pe.sk0 := dfkhe.sk.
pe.ct← PE.enc(pe.pk, µ, t = (t1, · · · , td)): For a public key pe.pk, a message µ, and ciphertext
tags t = (t1, · · · , td), return pe.ct← DFKHE.Enc(pe.pk, µ, t).
pe.ski ← PE.pun(pe.pk, pe.ski−1, t∗i ): For input pe.pk, pe.ski−1 and a punctured tag t∗i ,
– If i = 1: run dfkhe.sky0,ft∗
1
← DFKHE.KHom(pe.sk0, (y0, ft∗
1
)) and output pe.sk1 :=
dfkhe.sky0,ft∗
1
.
– If i ≥ 2: compute pe.ski ← DFKHE.KDel(dfkhe.pk, pe.ski−1, (y0, ft∗i )).
– Finally, output pe.ski.
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µ/⊥ ← PE.dec(pe.pk, (pe.ski, (t∗1, · · · , t∗i )), (pe.ct, t)): For input the public key pe.pk, a punc-
ture key pe.ski together with punctures (t
∗
1, · · · , t∗i ), a ciphertext pe.ct and its associated
tags t = (t1, · · · , td), the algorithm first checks whether or not ft∗
1
(t) = · · · = ft∗i (t) = y0. If
not, the algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, it returns the output of DFKHE.Dec(pe.ski, pe.ct).
Correctness.Remark that, over the choice of (λ, d, η, (t∗1, · · · , t∗η), (t1, · · · , td), η ≥ 0, t∗1, · · · , t∗η ∈
T , t1, · · · , td ∈ T \ {t∗1, · · · , t∗η}, we have ft∗j (t) = y0 for all j ∈ [η]. Then, it is clear that, the
induced PE Ψ is correct if and only if the DFKHE Π is correct.
Theorem 1. PE Ψ is selectively-secure CPA assuming that the underlying DFKHE Π is
selectively-CPA secure.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary A that is able to break the selective security of
Ψ with probability δ. We can construct a simulator S, which takes advantage of A and breaks
selective security of Π with the same probability.
Initialize. S would like to break the selective security of the (λ, d, (T ,Y,F)–DFHKE system
Π = (DFKHE.KGen,DFKHE.KHom,DFKHE.Enc, DFKHE.Dec, DFKHE.ExtEval, DFKHE.KDel),
where λ, d,T , Y, F are specified as in and around Equation (1).
Targeting. S calls A to get the target tags (t̂1, · · · , t̂d) in the game for Ψ , and lets it be t̂,
playing the role of the target variable in the game for Π.
Setup. S initializes a set of punctured tags T ∗ ← ∅, and a set of corrupted tags C∗ ← ∅ con-
taining all punctured tags at the time of the first corruption query. runs (dfkhe.pp, dfkhe.pk,
dfkhe.sk)← DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F) and gives dfkhe.pp, dfkhe.pk to A. Note that PE.key(1λ, d)
≡ DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F) by construction.
Query 1. In this phase, A adaptively makes puncture queries PQ(k, t∗k), where k implicitly
counts the number of PQ queries so far, and corruption queries CQ(). To reply PQ(k, t∗k),
S simply returns the output of DFKHE.KDel(dfkhe.pk, dfkhe.sky0,ft∗
1
,··· ,ft∗
k−1
), with noting
that when k = 1, then we have both dfkhe.sky0,ft∗
1
,··· ,ft∗
k−1
:= dfkhe.sk0 and DFKHE.KDel ≡
DFKHE.KHom and finally appends t∗k to T ∗.
The simulator just cares about the time at which the first CQ() has been completed. At
that time, S saves the value of the counter k and makes A’s puncture queries a list of
functions {ft∗
1
, · · · , ft∗
k
} and sets C∗ ← T ∗. We can consider that A has made a sequence
of k queries to the KG(dfkhe.sk, t̂, y, (f1, · · · , fk)) oracle in the DFKHE’s security game.
Recall that, the requirement for a query to KG to be accepted is that it must be not all
j ∈ [k] sastyfying fj(t̂) = y. This requirement is essentially fulfilled thanks to the condition
in the FE’s security game that there is at least one t∗j ∈ {t̂1, · · · , t̂d} ∩ C∗.
Challenge. A submits two messages µ0, µ1 (with t̂). S in turn chooses b $←− {0, 1} and returns
(dfkhe.ĉt, t̂)← DFKHE.Enc(dfkhe.pk, µb, t̂).
Query 2. The same as Query 1.
Guess. S outputs the same b′ ∈ {0, 1} as A has guessed.
It is clear that the FE adversary A is joining the DFKHE game, however it is essentially
impossible to distinguish the DFKHE game from the FE one as the simulated environment for
A is perfect. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
4 DFKHE and FE Construction from Lattices
At first, in Subsection 4.1 below, we will review the key-homomorphic mechanism, which is an
important ingredient for our lattice-based construction.
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4.1 Key-homomorphic Mechanism for Arithmetic Circuits
Let n, q > 0, k := ⌈log q⌉ and m := n · k. We exploit the gadget matrix G and its associated
trapdoor TG. According to [22, Section 4], the matrix G := In ⊗ gT ∈ Zn×mq , where gT =
[1 2 4 · · · 2k−1]. The associated trapdoor TG ∈ Zm×m is publicly known and ‖T˜G‖ ≤
√
5
(see [22, Theorem 4.1]).
Key-homomorphic Mechanism. We recap some basic facts useful for construction of eval-
uation algorithms for the family of polynomial depth and unbounded fan-in arithmetic circuits
(see [5, Section 4] for details). LetG ∈ Zn×mq be the gadget matrix given above. For x ∈ Zq, B ∈
Z
n×m
q , s ∈ Znq and δ > 0, define the following set Es,δ(x,B) := {(xG+B)T s+ e, where ‖e‖ <
δ}. More details can be found in [5].
Lemma 5 ( [5, Section 4]). Let n, q = q(n), m = Θ(n log q) be positive integers, x =
(x1, · · · , xd) ∈ Zdq , x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗d) ∈ Zdq , Bi ∈ Zn×mq , ci ∈ Es,δ(xi,Bi) for some s ∈ Znq and
δ > 0, Si ∈ Zm×mq for all i ∈ [d]. Also, let βF = βF (n) : Z → Z be a positive integer-valued
function, and F = {f : (Zq)d → Zq} be a family of functions, in which each function can be
computed by some circuit of a family of depth τ , polynomial-size arithmetic circuits (Cλ)λ∈N.
Then there exist DPT algorithms Evalpk, Evalct, Evalsim associated with βF and F such that the
following properties hold.
1. If Bf ← Evalpk(f ∈ F , (Bi)di=1), then Bf ∈ Zn×mq .
2. Let cf ← Evalct(f ∈ F , ((xi,Bi, ci))di=1), then cf ∈ Es,∆(f(x),Bf ), in which Bf ←
Evalpk(f, (Bi)
d
i=1) and ∆ < δ · βF .
3. The output Sf ← Evalsim(f ∈ F , ((x∗i ,Si))di=1,A) satisfies the relation ASf − f(x∗)G = Bf
and ‖Sf‖sup < βF with overwhelming probability, where Bf ← Evalpk(f, (ASi−x∗iG)di=1). In
particular, if S1, · · · ,Sd $←− {−1, 1}m×m, then ‖Sf‖sup < βF with all but negligible probability
for all f ∈ F .
In general, for a family F of functions represented by polynomial-size and unbounded fan-in
circuits of depth τ , the function βF is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 6 ( [5, Lemma 5.3]). Let n, q = q(n), m = Θ(n log q) be positive integers. Let Cλ
be a family of polynomial-size arithmetic circuits of depth τ and F = {f : (Zq)d → Zq} be the
set of functions f that can be computed by some circuit C ∈ Cλ as stated in Lemma 5. Also,
suppose that all (but possibly one) of the input values to the multiplication gates are bounded
by p < q. Then, βF = (
pd−1
p−1 ·m)τ · 20
√
m = O((pd−1m)τ
√
m).
Definition 6 (FKHE enabling functions). The tuple (Evalpk, Evalct, Evalsim) together with
the family F and the function βF = βF (n) in the Lemma 5 is called βF -FKHE enabling for
the family F .
4.2 LWE-based DFKHE Construction
Our LWE-based DFKHE construction Π is adapted from LWE–based FKHE and the key dele-
gation mechanism, both of which proposed in [5]. Roughly speaking, the key delegation mecha-
nism in the lattice setting is triggered using the algorithms ExtBasisLeft and ExtBasisRight and
RandBasis in Lemma 4. Formally, LWE-based DFKHE Π consists of the following algorithms:
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Parameters: Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter. Set n = n(λ), q = q(λ) and d = d(λ) to
be fixed such that d < q. Let η ∈ N be the maximum number of variables that can be
delegated and σ1, · · · , ση be Gaussian parameters. Also, we choose a constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
which is mentioned in Lemma 2. The constant is used to determine the tradeoff between the
security level and the efficiency of the system. Let F := {f |f : (Zq)d → Zq} be a family of
efficiently computable functions over Zq that can be computed by some circuit of a family
of depth τ , polynomial-size arithmetic circuits (Cλ)λ∈N. Take the algorithms (Evalpk, Evalct,
Evalsim) together with a function βF = βF (n) to be βF–FKHE enabling for F .
DFKHE.KGen(1λ,F): For the input pair (a security parameter λ ∈ N and a family F) 4, do
the following:
1. Choose m = Θ(n log q). The plaintext space isM := {0, 1}m, T := Zq. Additionally, let
χ be a χ0–bounded noise distribution (i.e, its support belongs to [−χ0, χ0]) for which
the (n, 2m, q, χ)–DLWE is hard.
2. Generate (A,TA)← TrapGen(n,m, q), sample U,B1, · · · ,Bd $←− Zn×mq .
3. Output the public key pk = {A,B1, · · ·Bd,U} and the initial secret key sk = {TA}.
DFKHE.KHom(sk, (y, f1)): For the input pair (the initial secret key sk and a pair (y, f1) ∈
Zq ×F) do the following:
1. Bf1 ← Evalpk(f1, (Bk)dk=1), Ey,f1 ← ExtBasisLeft([A|yG+Bf1 ],TA).
2. Ty,f1 ← RandBasis([A|yG + Bf1 ],Ey,f1 , σ1), output the secret key sky,f1 = {Ty,f1}.
Here, we set σ1 = ω(βF ·
√
log(2m)) for the security proof to work.
DFKHE.KDel(sky,f1,··· ,fη−1 , (y, fη)): For the input pair (the delegated secret key sky,f1,··· ,fη−1
and a pair (y, fη) ∈ Zq ×F) do the following:
1. Bfη ← Evalpk(fη, (Bk)dk=1).
2. Ey,f1,··· ,fη ← ExtBasisLeft([A|yG+Bf1 | · · · |yG+Bfη−1 |yG+Bfη ],Ty,f1,··· ,fη−1).
3. Ty,f1,··· ,fη ← RandBasis([A|yG+Bf1 | · · · |yG+Bfη−1 |yG+Bfη ],Ey,f1,··· ,fη , ση).
4. Output the secret key sky,f1,··· ,fη = {Ty,f1,··· ,fη}.
We set ση = σ1 · (
√
m logm)η−1 and discuss on setting parameters in details later.
DFKHE.Enc(µ, pk, t): For the input consiting of (a message µ = (µ1, · · · , µm) ∈ M, the public
key pk and ciphertext tags t = (t1, · · · , td) ∈ T d), perform the following steps:
1. Sample s
$←− Znq , eout, ein ← χm, and S1, · · · ,Sd $←− {−1, 1}m×m.
2. Compute e← (Im|S1| · · · |Sd)T ein = (eTin, eT1 , · · · , eTd )T .
3. Form H← [A|t1G+B1| · · · |tdG+Bd] and compute c = HT s+ e ∈ Z(d+1)mq ,
c = [cin|c1| · · · |cd], where cin = AT s+ ein and ci = (tiG+Bi)T s+ ei for i ∈ [d].
4. Compute cout ← UT s+ eout + µ⌈ q2⌉.
5. Output the ciphertext (ctt = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout), t).
DFKHE.ExtEval(f1, · · · , fη, ctt): For the input (a ciphertext ctt = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout) and
its associated tags t = (t1, · · · , td), and a list of functions f1, · · · , fη ∈ F), execute the
following steps:
1. Evaluate cfj ← Evalct(fj, ((tk,Bk, ck))dk=1) for j ∈ [η].
2. Output the evaluated ciphertext cf1,··· ,fη := (cf1 , · · · , cfη).
DFKHE.Dec(ctt, sky,f1,··· ,fη): For the input (a ciphertext ctt = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout), the as-
sociated tags t = (t1, · · · , td), and a delegated secret key sky,f1,··· ,fη , execute the following
steps:
1. If ∃j ∈ [η] s.t. fj(t) 6= y, then output ⊥. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
2. Sample R← SampleD([A|yG+Bf1 | · · · |yG+Bfη ],Ty,f1,··· ,fη ,U, ση).
4 Here, d also appears implicitly as an input.
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3. Evaluate (cf1 , · · · , cfη)← DFKHE.ExtEval(f1, · · · , fη, ctt).
4. Compute µ¯ := (µ¯1, · · · , µ¯m)← cout −RT (cin|cf1 | · · · |cfη ).
5. For ℓ ∈ [m], if |µ¯ℓ| < q/4 then output µℓ = 0; otherwise, output µℓ = 1.
In the following, we will demonstrate the correctness and the security of the LWE-based
DFKHE Π.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of Π). The proposed DFKHE Π is correct if the condition
(η + 1)2 · √m · ω((
√
m logm)η) · β2F + 2 <
1
4
(q/χ0) (2)
holds, assumming that fj(t) = y for all j ∈ [η].
Proof. We have µ¯ = cout −RT (cin|cf1 | · · · |cfη) = µ⌈ q2⌉ + eout −RT (ein|ef1 | · · · |efη ). Next, we
evaluate the norm of eout −RT (ein|ef1 | · · · |efη). Since cfj ∈ Es,∆(y,Bfη), for all j ∈ [η], where
∆ < χ0 · βF , then ‖(ein|ef1 | · · · |efη)‖ ≤ η ·∆+ χ0 ≤ (η · βF + 1)χ0. Then
‖eout −RT (ein|ef1 | · · · |efη)‖∞ ≤ ‖eout‖∞ + ‖RT ‖sup · ‖(ein|ef1 | · · · |efη)‖
≤ ((η + 1)2 · √m · ω((
√
m logm)η) · β2F + 2) · χ0,
where ‖RT ‖sup ≤ (η + 1)mση by Item 4 of Lemma 4 and ση = σ1 · (
√
m logm)η−1 = ω(βF ·√
logm) · (√m logm)η−1.
By choosing parameters such that ((η+1)2 ·√m ·ω((√m logm)η) ·β2F +2) ·χ0 < q/4, which
yields Equation (2), then the decryption is successful. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3 (IND-sVAR-CPA of Π). Assuming the hardness of (n, 2m, q, χ)–DLWE, the
proposed DFKHE Π is IND-sVAR-CPA.
Proof. The proof consists of a sequence of four games, in which the first Game 0 is the original
IND-sVAR-CPAsel,AΨ game. The last game chooses the challenge ciphertext uniformly at ran-
dom. Hence, the advantage of the adversary in the last game is zero. The games 2 and 3 are
indistinguishable thanks to a reduction from the DLWE hardness.
Game 0. This is the original IND-sVAR-CPAsel,AΨ game being played by an adversary A
and a challenger. At the initial phase, A announces a target variable t̂ = (t̂1, · · · , t̂d).
Note that, the challenger has to reply delegate key queries DKQ(y, f1, · · · , fk). However, if
(y, (f1, · · · , fk)) ∈ Zq×Fk such that f1(t̂) = · · · = f1(t̂) = y then the query will be aborted.
At the setup phase, the challenger generates pk = {A,B1, · · ·Bd,U}, the initial secret
key sk = {TA}, where B1, · · ·Bd $←− Zn×mq , U $←− Zn×mq , (A,TA) ← TrapGen(n,m, q). The
challenger then sends pk to the adversary, while it keeps sk secret. Also, in order to produce
the challenge ciphertext ĉt in the challenge phase, Ŝ1, · · · , Ŝd ∈ {−1, 1}m×m are generated
(Step 2 of DFKHE.Enc).
Game 1. This game slightly changes the way B0, · · ·Bd are generated in the setup phase.
Instead in the challenge phase, Ŝ1, · · · , Ŝd ∈ {−1, 1}m×m are sampled in the setup phase.
This allows to compute Bi := AŜi − t̂iG for i ∈ [d]. The rest of the game is the same as
Game 0.
Game 1 and Game 0 are indistinguishable thanks to the leftover hash lemma (i.e., Lemma
3).
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Game 2. In this game, the matrix A is not generated by TrapGen but chosen uniformly at
random from Zn×mq . The matrices B1, · · ·Bd are constructed as in Game 1. The secret key
is sk0 = {TG} instead.
The challenger replies to a delegated key query DKQ(y, f1, · · · , fk) as follows:
1. If f1(t̂) = fk(t̂) = y, the challenger aborts and restarts the game until there exists at
least one fj(t̂) 6= y. Without loss of generality, we can assume that fk(t̂) 6= y.
2. For all i ∈ [k], compute Ŝfi ← Evalsim(fi, ((t̂j , Ŝj))dj=1,A), and let Bfi = AŜfi− fi(t̂)G.
Remark that, Bf1 = Evalpk(fi, (Bj)
d
j=1). For choosing Gaussian parameters, note that
‖Ŝfi‖sup ≤ βF due to Item 3 of Lemma 5.
3. Ey,f1,··· ,fk ← ExtBasisRight([A|AŜf1+(y−f1(t̂))G| · · · |AŜfk+(y−fk(t̂))G],TG). Note
that, ‖Ey,f1,··· ,fk‖ ≤ ‖T˜G‖(1+‖Sfk‖sup) =
√
5(1+βF ) for all k ∈ [η] by Item 2 of Lemma
4.
4. Ty,f1,··· ,fk ← RandBasis([A|AŜf1+(y−f1(t̂))G| · · · |AŜfk+(y−fk(t̂))G], Ey,f1,··· ,fk , σk).
5. Return sky,f1,··· ,fk := {Ty,f1,··· ,fk}.
Game 2 and Game 1 are indistinguishable. The reason is that the distributions of A’s in
both games are statistically close and that the challenger’s response to the adversary’s query
is also the output of RandBasis.
Game 3. This game is similar to Game 2, except that the challenge ciphertext ĉt is chosen
randomly. Therefore, the advantage of the adversary A in Game 3 is zero.
Now we show that Games 2 and 3 are indistinguishable using a reduction from DLWE.
Reduction from DLWE. Suppose that A can distinguish Game 2 from Game 3 with a
non-negligible advantage. Using A, we construct a DLWE solver B. The reduction is as
follows:
– (n, 2m, q, χ)–DLWE instance. B is given a F $←− Zn×2mq , and a vector c ∈ Z2mq , where
either (i) c is random or (ii) c is in the LWE form c = FT s+ e,
for some random vector s ∈ Znq and e ← χ2m. The goal of B is to decide whether c is
random or generated from LWE.
– Initial. B now parses [cTin|cTout]T ← c, where cin, cout ∈ Zmq , [eTin|eTout]T ← e, where
ein, eout ← χm, and [A|U]← F, where A,U ∈ Zn×mq . That is,
cin = A
T s+ ein, cout = U
T s+ eout. (3)
Now B calls A to get the target variable t̂ = (t̂1, · · · , t̂d) to be challenged.
– Setup. B generates the keys as in Game 2. That is, Ŝ1, · · · , Ŝd $←− {−1, 1}m×m and
Bi := AŜi− t̂iG for i ∈ [d]. Finally, B sends A the public key pk = (A,B1, · · · ,Bd,U).
Also, B keeps sk = {TG} as the initial secret key.
– Query. Once A makes a delegated key query, B replies as in Game 2.
– Challenge. Once A submits two messages µ0 and µ1, B chooses uniformly at random
b
$←− {0, 1}, then computes ĉ← [Im|Ŝ1| · · · |Ŝd]T cin ∈ Z(d+1)mq and ĉout ← cout + µb⌈ q2⌉ ∈
Zq.
• Suppose c is generated by LWE, i.e., cin, cout satisfy Equation (3). In the DFKHE.Enc
algorithm, H = [A|t̂1G+B1| · · · |t̂dG+Bd] = [A|AŜ1| · · · |AŜd]. Then
ĉ = [Im|Ŝ1| · · · |Ŝd]T (AT s+ ein) = HT s+ ê,
where ê = [Im|Ŝ1| · · · |Ŝd]Tein. It is easy to see that ĉ is computed as in Game 2.
Additionally, ĉout = U
T s + êout + µb⌈ q2⌉ ∈ Zq. Then ĉt := (ĉ, ĉout) ∈ Z
(d+2)m
q is a
valid ciphertext of µb.
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• If cin, cout are random then ĉ is random (following a standard left over hash lemma
argument). And since ĉout is also random, ĉt := (ĉ, ĉout) is random in Z
(d+2)m
q which
behaves similarly to Game 3.
– Guess. Eventually, once A outputs his guess of whether he is interacting with Game 2
or Game 3, B outputs his decision for the DLWE problem.
We have shown that B can solve the (n, 2m, q, χ)–DLWE instance. ⊓⊔
Setting Parameters. In order to choose parameters, we should take the following into con-
sideration:
– For the hardness of DLWE, by Theorem 2, we choose ǫ, n, q, χ, where χ is a χ0-bounded
distribution, such that q/χ0 ≥ 2nǫ . We also note that, the hardness of DLWE via the tra-
ditional worst-case reduction (e.g., Lemma 2) does not help us much in proposing concrete
parameters for lattice-based cryptosystems. Instead, a more conservative methodology that
has been usually used in the literature is the so-called “core-SVP hardness”; see [2, Subsec-
tion 5.2.1] for a detailed reference.
– Setting Gaussian parameters:
1. First approach: Without caring the security proof, for trapdoor algorithms to work, we
can set σ1 = ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
log(2m)), with ‖T˜A‖ = O(
√
n logm) by Item 1 of Lemma
4. Note that, in DFKHE.KHom we have ‖T˜y,f1‖ < σ1 ·
√
2m by Item 5 of Lemma 4.
Then, σ2 = ‖T˜y,f1‖ · ω(
√
log(3m)) = σ1 · ω(
√
m logm). Similarly, we can set σk =
σ1 · (
√
m logm)k−1 for all k ∈ [η].
2. Second approach: For the security proof to work, we have to be careful in choosing
Gaussian parameters σ1, · · · , ση. Indeed, we have to choose σ1 = ω(βF ·
√
logm). In fact,
we remarked in Step 2 of Game 2 of the proof for Theorem 3 that ‖Ŝfi‖sup ≤ βF for all
i. And for a generic k we still obtain ‖E˜y,f1,··· ,fk‖ ≤ ‖T˜G‖(1 + ‖Sfk‖sup) =
√
5(1 + βF )
as we just exploit TG as the secret key. Hence, σk = ‖E˜y,f1,··· ,fk‖·ω(
√
log((k + 1)m)) =
ω(βF ·
√
logm) for all k ∈ [η].
3. Compared with σk of the first approach, σk’s of the second approach are essentially
smaller. Therefore, in order for both trapdoor algorithms and the security to work, we
should set σ1 = ω(βF ·
√
logm) and choose βF > ‖T˜A‖ =
√
n logm and then follow the
first approach in setting Gaussian parameters. Recall that, βF = (
pd−1
p−1 ·m)τ · 20
√
m =
O((pd−1m)τ
√
m) by Lemma 6.
– For the correctness: We need Condition (2) to hold, i.e., (η + 1)2 · √m · ω((√m logm)η) ·
β2F + 2 <
1
4 (q/χ0).
Sizes of Keys and Ciphertext. Recall that, throughout this work, we set m = Θ(n log q).
The public key corresponding d variables consists of d + 1 matrices of dimension n ×m over
Zq. Then the public key size is O((d+1) ·n2 log2 q). The initial secret key is the short trapdoor
matrix TA of dimension m × m generated by TrapGen such that ‖TA‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q), then
size is O(n2 log2 q · log(n log q)). The secret key after delegating η functions is the trapdoor
matrix Ty,f1,··· ,fη of dimension (η + 1)m × (η + 1)m and ‖Ty,f1,··· ,fη‖ < ση ·
√
(η + 1)m =
βF · ω((
√
m logm)η) with overwhelming probability by Lemma 1. Therefore its size is (η + 1) ·
n log q · (O(log(βF )+η · log(n log q))). The ciphertext is a tuple of (d+2) vectors of in Zmq hence
its size is O((d+ 2) · n log2 q)).
4.3 LWE-based PE Construction from DFKHE
We define the family of equality functions F := {ft∗ : Zdq → Zq|t∗ ∈ Zq}, where ft∗(t) :=
eqt∗(t1) + · · · + eqt∗(td), t = (t1, · · · , td), eqt∗ : Zq → Zq, satisfying that ∀t ∈ Zq, eqt∗(t) =
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1 (mod q) iff t = t∗, otherwise eqt∗(t) = 0 (mod q). Then ft∗(t) = 0 (mod q) iff eqt∗(ti) =
0 (mod q) if d < q, for all i ∈ [d]. By applying the generic framework in Section 3 to DFKHE
demonstrated in Subsection 4.2 and modifying the resulting PE, we come up with the LWE-
based PE construction Ψ = {PE.key, PE.enc, PE.pun,PE.dec} presented below:
PE.key(1λ): For the input security parameter λ, do the following:
1. Choose n = n(λ), q = q(λ) prime, and the maximum number of tags d = d(λ) per a
ciphertext such that d < q.
2. Choose m = Θ(n log q). The plaintext space is M := {0, 1}m, T := Zq. Additionally,
let χ be a χ0–bounded noise distribution (i.e, its support belongs to [−χ0, χ0] for which
the (n, 2m, q, χ)–DLWE is hard. Set σ = ω(βF ·
√
logm).
3. Sample (A,TA)← TrapGen(n,m, q), U,B1, · · · ,Bd $←− Zn×mq .
4. Output pk = {A,B1, · · ·Bd,U} and sk0 = {TA}.
PE.enc(µ, pk, {t1, · · · , td}): For the input consiting of (a message µ, the public key pk and
ciphertext tags (t1, · · · , td) ∈ T d), perform the following steps:
1. Sample s
$←− Znq , eout, ein ← χm, S1, · · · ,Sd $←− {−1, 1}m×m.
2. Compute e← (Im|S1| · · · |Sd)T ein = (eTin, eT1 , · · · , eTd )T .
3. Form H← [A|t1G+B1| · · · |tdG+Bd] and compute c = HT s+ e ∈ Z(d+1)mq ,
c = [cin|c1| · · · |cd], where cin = AT s+ ein and ci = (tiG+Bi)T s+ ei for i ∈ [d].
4. Compute cout ← UT s+ eout + µ⌈ q2⌉, output (ct = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout), (t1, · · · , td)).
PE.pun(skη−1, t
∗
η): For the input (a puncture key skη−1 and a punctured tag t
∗
η ∈ T ), do:
1. Evaluate Beqη ← Evalpk(ft∗η , (Bk)dk=1).
2. Compute Eeqη ← ExtBasisLeft([A|Beq1 | · · · |Beqη−1 |Beqη ],Teqη−1).
3. Teqη ← RandBasis([A|Beq1 | · · · |Beqη−1 |Beqη ],Eeqη , ση).
4. Output skη := (Teqη , (t
∗
1, · · · , t∗η), (Beq1 , · · · ,Beqη)).
PE.dec(ct, t, (skη , {t∗1, · · · , t∗η})): For the input (a ciphertext ct = (cin, c1, · · · , cd, cout), the
associated tags t = (t1, · · · , td), a puncture key skη and the associated punctured tags
{t∗1, · · · , t∗η} ⊂ T ), execute the following steps:
1. If there exists j ∈ [η] such that ft∗j (t) 6= 0, then output ⊥. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
2. Parse skη := (Teqη , (t
∗
1, · · · , t∗η), (Beq1 , · · · ,Beqη)).
3. Sample R← SampleD([A|Beq1 | · · · |Beqη ],Teqη ,U, ση).
4. Evaluate ceqj ← Evalct(ft∗j , ((tk,Bk, ck))dk=1), for j ∈ [η].
5. Compute µ¯ = (µ¯1, · · · , µ¯m)← cout −RT (cin|ceq1 | · · · |ceqη).
6. For ℓ ∈ [m], if |µ¯ℓ| < q/4 then output µℓ = 0; otherwise, output µℓ = 1.
We remark that all analysis done for the LWE-based DFKHE in Subsection 4.2 can perfectly
applied to our LWE-based PE. Therefore, we do not mention the analysis again in this section.
For completeness, we only state two main theorems as below.
Theorem 4 (Correctness of Ψ). The proposed PE Ψ is correct if (η+1)2·m1+ η2 ·ω((√logm)η+1)·
β2F + 2 <
1
4(q/χ0), assumming that t
∗
j 6= tk for all (j, k) ∈ [η]× [d].
Theorem 5 (IND-sPUN-CPA). The proposed PE Ψ scheme is IND-sPUN-CPA thanks to
the IND-sVAR-CPA of the underlying DFKHE Π.
18 W. Susilo, D. H. Duong, H. Q. Le and J. Pieprzyk
5 Discussion on Unbounded Number of Ciphertext Tags
The idea of [8] might help us to extend the LWE-based DFKHE construction from Subsection
4.2 (resp., PE from Subsection 4.3) to a variant that supports arbitrary number of variables
(resp., ciphertext tags). We call this variant unDFKHE. Although, the original idea of [8] is
applied to ABE with attributes belonging to {0, 1} using the XOR operation, we believe that
it might be adapted to work well with our DFKHE with variables and punctures over Zq using
the addition modulo q (denoted ⊕q.
In unDFKHE, the maximum number of ciphertext tags d is not fixed in advance. Then, in the
key generation algorithm, we cannot generate B1, · · · ,Bd and give them to the public. In order
to solve this issue, we utilize a family of pseudorandom functions PRF=(PRF.Gen, PRF.Eval),
where PRF.Gen(1λ) takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a seed s ∈ Zℓq of length ℓ =
ℓ(λ) (which depends on λ) and PRF.Eval(s,x) takes as input a seed s ∈ Zℓq and a variable x ∈ Z∗q
of arbitrary length and returns an element in Zq. The family of pseudorandom functions helps us
to stretch a variable of fixed length ℓ to one of arbitrary length d as follows. In unDFKHE.KGen,
for a variable t of length d = |t|, instead of B1, · · · ,Bd, we generate B1, · · · ,Bℓ and use them
to produce B1, · · · ,Bd later. This can be done by running Evalpk(PRF.Eval(·, i), (Bk)ℓk=1), for
i ∈ [d], where PRF.Eval(·, i) acts as a function that can be evaluated by Evalpk. Accordingly,
any function f ∈ F will also be transformed to f∆ defined by f∆(t) := f(t ⊕q ∆≤d) before
joining to any computation later on. Here ∆i := PRF.Eval(s, i) for i ∈ [d], ∆≤d = (∆1, · · · ,∆d).
Also remark that, f∆(t ⊕q (q≤d − ∆≤d)) = f(t), where q≤d = (q, · · · , q) ∈ Zd. Therefore, in
unDFKHE.KHom, Bf ← Evalpk(f∆, (Bk)dk=1).
Actually, there are a lot of work left to be done. Due to space limitation, we leave details
of this section for the full version of this paper.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we show puncturable encryption can be constructed from the so-called delegat-
able fully key-homomorphic encryption. From the framework, we instantiate our puncturable
encryption construction using LWE. Our puncturable encryption enjoys the selective indis-
tinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks, which can be converted into adaptive indistin-
guishability under chosen ciphertext attacks using well-known standard techniques. For future
works, there are few investigation directions worth pursuing such as design of: (i) puncturable
lattice-based ABE as in [24], (ii) efficient puncturable forward-secure encryption schemes as
proposed in [18] or (iii) puncturable encryption schemes, whose puncture key size is constant
or puncturable ecnryption schemes support unlimited number of punctures.
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